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EFFECTIVE ACTION TO STRENGTHEN THE BTWC REGIME: 
THE IMPACT OF DUAL USE CONTROLS ON UK SCIENCE 
 
by Caitríona McLeish† & Paul Nightingale*
 
Introduction 
 
1.  Concerns about the proliferation of biological weapons and the threat posed by 
bioterrorism have assumed greater political prominence in recent years.1 In response, 
governments are actively attempting to frustrate the diffusion of technologies, relevant to the 
production of biological weapons, to regimes and non-state actors which might develop and 
use such weapons. Their most recent efforts have involved the introduction of a range of new 
national measures to control access to materials, knowledge and technologies.  The States 
Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) have at their annual 
meetings during the intersessional period between the Fifth Review Conference and the Sixth 
Review Conference been seeking to ‘discuss, and promote common understanding and 
effective action’ on some such national measures2. 
 
2.   The topics being addressed by the States Parties are: 
 
i.  The adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions set 
forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
 
ii.  National mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of 
pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; 
 
iii.  Enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
iv.  Strengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and 
existing mechanisms for the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of 
infectious diseases affecting humans, animals, and plants; 
 
v.  The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. 
 
                                                 
† Dr Caitríona McLeish is a Research Fellow at SPRU, University of Sussex and is attached to The Harvard 
Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation. Email: c.a.mcleish@sussex.ac.uk
* Dr. Paul Nightingale is a Senior Research Fellow in Technology Policy at the ESRC funded Complex Product 
System (CoPS) Innovation Centre at SPRU, University of Sussex. 
1 United Nations Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-
General’s High Level Panel on Threat, Challenges and Change, A/59/565, 2 December 2004 (see also Graham 
S. Pearson, The UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel: Biological Weapons Related Issues, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 14, May 2005.  Available at http://www. 
brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc), G8 (2004), Action Plan on Nonproliferation, Sea Island Summit, 9 June 2004, G8 
(2003), Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A G8 Declaration, Evian Summit, 3 June 2003 
2 United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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Topics i and ii were addressed in 2003, topics iii and iv in 2004 and topic v will be addressed 
in 2005 at the Meeting of States Parties on 5 to 9 December 2005 which will be preceded by 
the Meeting of Experts on 13 to 24 June 2005. 
 
3.  The topics addressed in 2003 in regard to the adoption of necessary, national measures to 
implement the prohibitions and to national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security 
and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins together with the topic for 2005 
regarding codes of conduct for scientists are directly related to measures to control access to 
materials, knowledge and technologies. 
 
4.  Preventing the diffusion of the necessary knowledge and technologies used to develop 
biological weapons is complicated because the underlying technologies often have legitimate 
and socially beneficial applications. Any controls to prevent their hostile application can also 
potentially disrupt legitimate activity, thereby generating social costs. For example, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the introduction of biosecurity controls in the US and Germany are 
adversely affecting scientific research in those countries.3  Governments therefore need to 
balance these costs against the security benefits that such controls generate.   
 
5.   To do this policy makers need information on the impact of these new ‘biosecurity’ 
measures. However, this is a new area of policy and few impact assessments have been 
performed. This pilot project, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council4, has 
developed and validated new methods for assessing the impact that UK government 
biosecurity policies, introduced to prevent legitimate scientific research from being misused, 
are having on the practice of science. This Briefing Paper outlines the project and provides 
some initial results in order to assist the States Parties to the BTWC in their consideration in 
2005 of codes of conduct for scientists and in 2006 at the BTWC Sixth Review Conference 
when States Parties will be considering further action to be taken on the five topics 
considered during the intersessional period. 
 
What is dual use? 
 
6.  This project was concerned with ‘dual use’ technologies. Dual use is a term that is applied 
to the tangible and intangible features of a technology that enable it to be applied to both 
hostile and peaceful ends with no, or only minor, modifications.5 Most peaceful applications 
are civilian in context, but there are also peaceful military applications, such as developing 
and producing vaccines against biological weapon agents. Hostile contexts have traditionally 
been thought of as military and state-based, but increasingly attention has been directed 
towards the possibility that non-state actors, such as terrorists, might use biological weapons.6 
                                                 
3 See for example, “An open letter to Elias Zerhouni” Science, Vol 307, Issue 5714, March 4th 2005; Cohen et 
al, “The pitfalls of bioterrorism preparedness: the anthrax and smallpox experiences”, American Journal of 
Public Health, vol 10, 2004; Brumfiel G, “US universities up in arms over licence plans for foreign staff”, 
Nature, vol 431, 2004; van Aken et al, “Biosecurity requires international supervision”, Nature, vol 431, 2004; 
May T. “Isolation is not the answer”, Nature, vol 429, 2004. 
4 The ESRC is an independent research council in the UK charged with promoting and supporting research into 
key issues of concern to social science. 
5 Molas-Gallart J and JP Robinson (1997), Assessment of Dual-use Technologies in the Context of European 
Security and Defence, Report for the Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA), European 
Parliament. 
6 See for example, Interpol “Final Communiqué”, 1st Interpol Global Conference, Lyon, France, 1-2 March 
2005 as downloaded from http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/Conferences/FinalCommunique.asp
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The dual use nature of some of the relevant technologies and scientific knowledge raises the 
possibility that scientists engaged in legitimate research for peaceful purposes might have 
their work misused and applied to biological warfare purposes. This includes the possibility 
of inadvertent assistance through seemingly harmless activities, such as postgraduate 
teaching. 
 
7.  The 'dual use dilemma' faced by the many countries who are determined to take measures 
to reduce opportunities for biological weapons development is that, compared to hostile 
applications, there is a vast range of peaceful purposes. Moreover, these applications are 
spreading across the world and in many cases their diffusion should be encouraged rather 
than slowed down. Governing dual use technologies therefore poses a serious policy design 
dilemma: the regulatory regime needs to balance the suppression of negative applications (in 
order to reduce the risk of biological weapons) without hindering the development of 
technology for peaceful and permitted purposes. 
 
8.  The governance regime to achieve this has at its heart the 1972 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC). This Convention came into force in 
1975 and currently has 153 state parties and 16 signatory states7. The BWC obliges its States 
Parties never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or 
retain:  
 
Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes; 
Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for 
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.8
 
Furthermore, the Convention requires its States Parties to implement it nationally by taking 
any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery 
specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its 
jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.9
 
9.  When implementing the BTWC nationally, the United Kingdom, through the adoption of 
the Biological Weapons Act 1974, placed the obligation on all of its citizens “never in any 
circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: microbial or 
other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and 
in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
                                                 
7 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, List of 
States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction as at December 2004, Second 
Meeting, 6 - 10 December 2004, BWC/MSP/2004/INF.2 dated 3 December 2004.  Available at 
http://www.opbw 
8 Article 1, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1972. Available at http://www.opbw 
9 Article 1V, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 1972. Available at http://www.opbw 
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purposes”.10 The 1974 Act additionally obliges citizens not to transfer, enter into an 
agreement to transfer, or make arrangements under which another person transfers any 
biological agent or toxin “if the biological agent or toxin is likely to be kept or used (whether 
by the transferee or any other person) otherwise than for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes and he knows or has reason to believe that this is the case”.11  
 
10.  As well as implementing the BTWC at the national level, governments use a range of 
other national policies to control the proliferation of dual use technologies. Most of these 
regulatory efforts aim to provide sufficient oversight of the possession and transfers of 
technology so that roadblocks can be put in place in time to stop the application of 
technology for illicit purposes. The most recent pieces of biosecurity legislation that entered 
into UK law are the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 200112 which amended the 
Biological Weapons Act, 1974 and placed new legal obligations on the scientific community 
to ensure their technologies are not misused and misappropriated, and the secondary 
legislation13 to the Export Control Act, 2002 made in 2003 and implemented in 2004 which 
regulates the transfer of intangible technologies. 
 
11.  The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 200114 amends the Biological Weapons Act, 
1974 (e.g. the legislation now covers the transfer and making of arrangements to transfer or 
agree to transfer any biological agent or toxin) and places new security obligations on the 
certain pathogens and toxins listed in Schedule 5 of the Act. The new legal obligations 
include the duty to notify Secretary of State before keeping or using dangerous substances; 
information about security of dangerous substances and information about persons with 
access to dangerous substances. The list of pathogens and toxins in Schedule 5 of the Act 
contains 19 viruses, 5 rickettsiae, 13 bacteria, and 11 toxins; these are reproduced in the 
Annex to this Briefing Paper.  The Act also includes any genetic material containing any 
nucleic acid sequence associated those listed pathogens and toxins and any genetically 
modified organism containing any such sequence.   
 
12.  The further piece of new legislation is the secondary legislation15 to the Export Control 
Act, 2002 introduced in 2004. By the introduction of this secondary legislation, export 
controls in the UK have been extended to include transfers related to a WMD end-use (i) 
made by any means; (including face-to-face discussions and demonstration); (ii) made within 
the UK or by UK persons outside the EC (where the end-use is outside the EC); and (iii) 
technical assistance to a WMD programme outside the EC. 
 
                                                 
10 Article 1, The Biological Weapons Act, United Kingdom, 1974. Available at http://www.opbw 
11 Article 1A, The Biological Weapons Act, United Kingdom, 1974 (as amended by the Anti Terrorism Crime 
and Security Act, 2001). 
12 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001.  Available at 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm Part VI amends the Biological Weapons Act 1974. 
13 Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 2764, Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical 
Assistance (Control) Order 2003, made 30 October 2003, coming into force 1 May 2004.  Available at; 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2003/20032764.htm 
14 Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001.  Available at 
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm 
15 Statutory Instrument 2003 No. 2764, Export of Goods, Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical 
Assistance (Control) Order 2003, made 30 October 2003, coming into force 1 May 2004.  Available at; 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2003/20032764.htm 
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Project objectives and methods 
 
13.  The aim of this pilot project was to assist the successful design and implementation of 
policy by developing and validating new methods for gathering qualitative and quantitative 
data on the impact of biosecurity controls on UK science.  
 
14.  The project gathered data using questionnaires and interviews from a small sample of the 
UK scientific community. The sample was constructed using standard bibliometric methods 
based on a network of UK scientists who had worked with and published peer-reviewed 
articles  between 1989 and 2004 relating to dangerous pathogens, as defined in Schedule 5 of 
the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001.  This dataset was then reduced to provide a 
sample of 100 scientists engaged in work with Schedule 5 agents who had published more 
than one article on such agents between 1989 and 2004. A control group of 28 members of 
the scientific community who had not worked with Schedule 5 agents although they were 
working on other agents in BL2 or BL3 laboratories was also selected to take part in this 
project. This control group enabled the results of the research to be placed in a wider context 
and allowed the research team to evaluate how representative the views of our sample were.  
 
15. The development, piloting and validation of the questionnaire was undertaken in 
collaboration with both the security and scientific communities in the UK over a six month 
period. This involved an iterative process of finding unambiguous terminology and becoming 
aware of the specific issues facing different communities. The questionnaire sought 
information under four main headings: 
 
a.  The type of institution, its size and the nature of its work; 
b.  The impact of the current regime of biosafety and biosecurity regulations; 
c.   Institutional costs and benefits of these regulations. 
d.  Perceptions within the scientific community about a range of biological weapons 
issues. 
 
 Once the questionnaire was piloted, it was sent to all 128 – the dataset of 100 and the control 
group of 28 – members of the UK scientific community, which included scientists, funders of 
science, biosafety officials and security officials.  
 
16. The project achieved a 53% response rate (68 usable responses). Interviews were also 
conducted with 27 of the responders to explore at a deeper level the individual answers 
received and to test the general trends emerging. The following is based on the 68 usable 
questionnaire responses and additional data collected during the 27 interviews 
 
Who participated? 
 
17.  The scientists in the dataset of 100 who responded to the questionnaire had all worked 
with agents listed in Schedule 5 of the 2001 Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act (71% 
with the pathogens, 76% with Schedule 5 toxins and 91% with the genetic material associated 
with the action of either the pathogens or toxins).   The majority were located within 
universities or other teaching institutions (68%), although government laboratories (9%) and 
commercial R&D (6%) were also represented. Institution size was typically between 11 and 
100 active researchers, although a number of smaller institutions with less than ten active 
researchers were also represented. The institutions contained the necessary equipment and 
infrastructure to perform work at hazard group 2 (91%) and hazard group 3 (74%), as detailed 
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in the 2002 Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations.16 Seventy-nine per cent 
of the institutions were able to work with toxins or with genetic material associated with the 
action of pathogens or toxins under conditions of containment.  
 
18. The respondents tended to be more senior, better networked and more experienced than a 
typical member of the UK scientific community would be. For example, 71% of the scientists 
held positions of overall responsibility for research projects using Schedule 5 agents, 68% 
were day-to-day managers of laboratories, and just over half of the scientists (53%) were 
actively engaged in research with Schedule 5 agents. Several of the participants indicated 
having experience as biosafety (44%) and/or biosecurity advisors (24%). 
 
19.  Over half of the total sample, 56%, described themselves as having been previously 
involved with biosecurity issues including interactions with relevant government officials.  
 
What did the project find? 
 
20.   The project produced three key findings of policy interest:  
 
•  The first finding is that thus far the implementation of new biosecurity measures in 
the UK do not seem to have had the same negative impact as has been reported in the 
US and Germany. This unexpected finding is important because it suggests that 
biosecurity policy options do not have to involve a trade-off between advances in 
scientific research and security. While clearly it is possible that advances in scientific 
understanding can increase the risks of misuse, and, similarly, that draconian security 
measures could disrupt science, this finding suggests that, at present, this is not 
necessarily the case. 
 
• The second finding is that the success of the implementation of these new 
biosecurity measures was related to three factors (1) pre-existing security and 
biosafety measures; (2) a responsive approach to regulation by the implementing 
body; and (3) a flexible and socially responsible reaction by this sample of the 
scientific community. Had any one of these conditions not been in place, the costs 
could have been substantially higher. However, together they have contributed 
towards a successful implementation thus far. 
 
• The third finding is that, while there has been successful implementation thus far of 
the requirements of the 2001 Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act, if there is a 
requirement to further strengthen the biosecurity norm such implementation may be 
more difficult. If such further security measures are required then a greater degree of 
interaction between the scientific and the security communities is likely to be 
necessary to minimise implementation costs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Schedule 3, Additional Provisions Relating to Work with Biological Agents, Part 1, Provisions of General 
Application to Biological Agents, The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations, United 
Kingdom, 2002. 
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Specific findings 
 
21.  This section examines some of the specific findings of the pilot project as they relate to 
operational procedures, impact of the new requirements and perceptions held by our sample 
of the UK scientific community about biological weapons issues.  
 
Channels of communication  
 
22.  Our sample of the UK scientific community received most of their information about 
changes in biosafety or biosecurity regulations through channels of communication which 
have been designed primarily for the distribution of health and safety information. Our 
sample indicated that their main sources of information were targeted distributions of 
information from the Health and Safety Executive (85%), whilst 59% of the sample 
performed proactive scanning of health and safety websites. However, over half the sample 
(53%) also received information from targeted distribution by governmental departments 
such as the Department of Trade and Industry. Only 15% actively scanned other sources for 
information, which included those sources primarily handling biosecurity issues.  
 
23. The finding that our sample used for health and safety channels to gain their information 
reflects the long-established, close links between the scientific communities and those 
involved in ensuring that health and safety requirements are met, which is especially true in 
the life sciences area in regard to biosafety.  This established relationship has been used to 
successfully implement a range of regulations on scientific practice in the UK since the 
1970s. This is important because it highlights how the UK scientific community in the life 
sciences was already subject to regulations before the introduction of new biosecurity 
controls, and that this earlier implementation of these biosafety regulations created a link 
between government and science. 
 
Procedures in place before 2001 
 
24.  One of the main factors which has influenced the level of costs associated with 
introducing new biosecurity controls in the UK seems to have been the existence of a range 
of procedures at institutions before the introduction of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security 
Act in 2001. Many organisations in the sample of the UK scientific community had pre-
existing procedures for the purposes of either biosafety obligations or concerns about animal 
rights terrorism. These procedures also functioned as biosecurity controls and thus helped 
reduce the costs of implementing the specific security requirements attached to Schedule 5 
pathogens and toxins. For example, the majority of our respondents reported their institutions 
as having procedures to monitor the acquisition of dangerous material (71%) and disposal of 
equipment (71%) which pre-dated the obligations found in the Anti Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act, 2001. Similarly, 71% and 74% of the sample reported that access to laboratories 
and data by occasional visitors and short-term workers was controlled in their institutions 
prior to 2001. There were similar pre-existing controls in place in over half the institutions to 
govern the transfer of dangerous materials on-site (56%) and off-site (65%).  
 
Changes in operational procedures since 2001 
 
25.  Notwithstanding these existing procedures, our sample of the UK scientific community 
indicated that substantial changes have occurred in the operational procedures of their 
institutions since 2001. When asked about those changes, the sample reported that more 
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attention is now being given to: biosafety obligations (79%), risk assessments (68%), 
material safety (53%), material transfer (56%), and ethical reviews (47%). Whilst a 
substantial number of the sample (41%) reported their institutions as having had in place 
procedures to review personnel with current access to controlled pathogens prior to 2001, 
only 26% reported an increase in that activity since the introduction of the Anti Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act, 2001.  
 
26.  When asked what the sample believed had caused these procedural changes, the majority 
of our sample (74%) believed they were the result of the new legal requirements but almost 
half (41%) believed that other pressures, such as the increased activities in the UK of animal 
rights protestors, might have been responsible.  
 
Benefits: new funding contracts and partners 
 
27.  Only a small subset of the sample (15%) reported having received any direct benefit 
from the increased attention to biosecurity since 2001. Of those that did record a benefit, it 
typically took the form of winning new contracts or collaborative partners. The small number 
of participants that had moved into new areas of R&D (15%) did so mainly for financial 
reasons. Only one institution listed as a benefit the increased opportunities for discussion 
with government officials on the validity of these measures. Whilst these numbers seem low, 
it is important to note that 26% of our sample thought that it might be too soon to judge 
whether they could experience any benefits. In the USA, concerns about bioterrorism have 
opened up new funding sources for research, and it is conceivable that our sample of the UK 
scientific community may benefit from this in the future. 
 
Costs: experiences of major complications or setbacks in the last three years  
 
28.  Although some of the sample has experienced benefits, the project also gathered data on 
a range of costs that have been experienced since 2001. Forty one percent of the sample 
indicated having experienced no major complications or setbacks in the last three years. 
However, our sample did indicate that four research projects have had to be abandoned as a 
direct result of the recent increase in national and international attention to the need to 
prevent science and technology from being diverted into biological warfare or bioterrorism 
purposes.  
 
29.  Despite this low number, a large proportion of the sample reported experiencing other 
‘major complications or setbacks’ over the last three years. The issue causing the most 
complications or setbacks was the difficulty in obtaining pathogens and toxins, but other 
issues have also caused major complications such as increased mandatory biosafety 
requirements (15%), increased mandatory biosecurity requirements, and changes to waste 
disposal requirements (both experienced by 12% of the sample).  
 
30.  Further investigation of these results found that those who had experienced these ‘major 
complications and setbacks’ believed they were as much a result of changes in US biosecurity 
controls as changes in UK requirements. The influence of US regulations on UK science 
reaffirms the global nature of science and consequently indicates the global impact of any 
form of biosecurity control.  
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Which policies are worth considering?  
 
31.  Our sample of the UK scientific community was presented with a list of policy options 
that might be considered to enhance biosecurity and asked which they would consider as a 
means to strengthen the biosecurity norm. The figures presented in Table 1 indicate 
respondents who thought the measures were worth considering, rather than respondents who 
supported such measures. 
 
Table 1: Views on biosecurity policy options 
 
Policy Options to Enhance Biosecurity 
Percentage who would 
consider the option 
Increased security checks on all personnel currently working 
with dangerous pathogens, toxins or genetic material 
62% 
Increased screening of all new personnel with future access to 
dangerous pathogens, etc. 
62% 
Requiring procedures to authorise and control off-site transfers 
of dangerous pathogens, etc. 
56% 
Increased requirements for material control in institutions 53% 
Scrutiny by funding bodies considering R&D proposals 47% 
Scrutiny by scientific journals when papers are submitted 47% 
More rigorous (safety) risk assessment of proposed work 41% 
More rigorous ethical review of proposed work 41% 
Codes of conduct 32% 
Denying access to nationals from countries of concern to 
dangerous pathogens, etc. 
21% 
 
These results indicate that the sample of the UK scientific community are willing to consider 
a wide range of possible policy options, but prefer options that do not unduly hinder research 
or teaching.  
 
32.  Further investigation of the reasons for lack of support for more rigorous safety or ethical 
assessment found a widespread belief that current levels of risk assessment and ethical review 
were adequate and that further rigour would impede research. It was also discovered that the 
limited support for the last two options was due to a lack of understanding of their underlying 
logic. For example, the sample of the UK scientific community failed to see how 
implementing a code of conduct would strengthen biosecurity or help to ensure an effective 
biosecurity norm across the UK science base.  
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33.  In the case of the last option, only 21% of the sample believed that denying access to 
nationals from countries of concern was an option worth considering. This result seems to 
conflict with the high scoring options of increased security checks on all personnel with 
current or future access to dangerous pathogens. This suggests the presence of other factors in 
the samples’ decision-making processes. The project found that one such factor is the support 
for the cultural norm of universality of participation in research irrespective of an individual’s 
nationality. 
  
Who ought to have responsibility for protecting against misuse?  
 
34.  When asked who ought to be responsible for protecting against the possible misuse of the 
life sciences, our sample of the UK scientific community favoured self-governance by the 
institutions themselves (76%) and the scientific community at large (71%). There was also a 
preference for funding bodies to take responsibility for assessing risk before research takes 
place rather than for scientific journals to address the risks after the research is completed (a 
59% to 29% preference). Reasons given for the high preference toward some form of self-
governance were based on a response to frustration caused by “overly complex and 
bureaucratic regulations”.  
 
35.  However, the sample generally recognised that some form of government participation 
was necessary. Fifty-eight per cent of the sample believed that of the options they would 
consider to strengthen the biosecurity norm, the best practice for implementation would be 
through formal regulation by government following consultation with members of the 
scientific community. Participants explained the need for formal regulation as ensuring 
“consistency”, “uniformly high standards of design and implementation” and application 
“across the board”. Mention was also given to the need for “outside auditing and regulation 
with sanctions that pose a real threat to those that do not comply” indicating some scepticism 
about self-regulation.  
 
36.  Of the options given, a marked preference was given for a focal role in the development 
and implementation of formal regulations to be given to government departments with which 
the sample have pre-existing relationships, such as the Health and Safety Executive (68%) or 
the Department of Trade and Industry (32%). Of those government departments primarily 
involved with non-health and safety issues, 47% of the sample preferred the involvement of 
the Home Office or the Security Services.  
 
Analysis  
 
37.  When interpreting the results from this work it is important to recognise that this was 
only a pilot project. Care therefore needs to be taken in drawing conclusions or policy 
implications, as results are indicative rather than conclusive. However, having noted these 
caveats these the results do suggest that the implementation of new biosecurity controls in the 
UK has been conducted very successfully. The project found that 79% of our sample 
regarded the current balance in the UK between scientific freedom and security as 
satisfactory.  
 
38.  It is, of course, possible that the research was undertaken too early – however, the 
requirements of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001 came into force in 
December 2001 hence our sample had had more than three years experience of its 
implementation. Although new legislation or improperly handled implementation has the 
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potential to generate substantial costs, the lack of substantial disruption is an important 
finding as it suggests that science and security do not necessarily have to be in conflict with 
one another.   
 
39.  As already noted, the research suggests three factors that have contributed to the 
successful implementation (thus far) of UK biosecurity controls:  
 
1. Pre-existing biosafety measures which provided a degree of biosecurity; 
2. A responsive approach to regulation by the implementing body; and 
3. A flexible and socially responsible reaction to the new controls by the UK 
scientific community. 
 
Factors influencing successful implementation 1: biosafety and biosecurity 
 
40.  One of the main contributing factors for the successful implementation thus far of the 
obligations in the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 2001 has been the high level of 
pre-existing biosafety procedures that can also function as biosecurity measures. The links 
between biosafety and biosecurity have been a recurring theme in this project.  
 
41.  Scientific activity in the UK has been heavily regulated since the 1970s through 
successive health and safety measures. The Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974 for example:  
 
[I]ntroduced a broad goal setting, non-prescriptive model, based on the view that 
‘those that create risk are best placed to manage it’.  
 
Instead of existing detailed and prescriptive industry regulations, it created a flexible system 
whereby regulations express goals and principles, and are supported by codes of practice and 
guidance. Based on consultation and engagement, the new regime was designed to deliver a 
proportionate, targeted and risk-based approach.17  
 
42.  That ‘flexible system’ has since created procedures to deal with the acquisition of 
dangerous material, access to laboratories and data by visitors and short-term workers, and 
the transfer of dangerous materials.  
 
43.  Although biosafety and biosecurity are fundamentally different – biosafety being 
concerned with protecting the health and safety of workers and the environment whilst the 
central concern of biosecurity is unauthorised acquisition – the norms are compatible and it 
can be argued that the implementation of UK biosecurity measures has drawn heavily on the 
biosafety model. The new biosecurity legislation, for instance, has concentrated on tightening 
existing practices rather than introducing radically new requirements. Indeed some of the 
procedural changes introduced into UK laboratories since 2001, such as more rigorous risk 
assessment procedures, increased material safety requirements, and improved recording and 
regulation of the possession and transfer of dangerous materials, may have occurred as a 
result of the periodic reviews of biosafety that have become the practice in UK workplaces, 
rather than specifically in response to biosecurity legislation and government inspections.  
 
                                                 
17 Health and Safety Executive Thirty Years on and Looking Forward: The Development and Future of the 
Health and Safety System in Great Britain, 2004. 
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44. This suggests that the variation in the implementation costs, nationally and 
internationally, of biosecurity policies (e.g. disruption to research, additional spending) can 
be explained, at least in part, by the extent of pre-existing national biosafety regulations. 
Furthermore, this suggests that the costs of implementation might be substantially higher in 
institutions with lower levels of health and safety procedures. Given that the sample was 
biased towards scientists working with dangerous human pathogens, extending the 
implementation process beyond Schedule 5 of the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 
2001 might generate more substantial costs.  
 
Factors influencing successful implementation 2: the implementation process 
 
45.  Effective implementation of any biosecurity control on dual use technologies is 
challenging because it has the potential to impose substantial costs upon legitimate actors. 
Further, effective implementation requires the co-operation of the scientific community, 
many of whom will not have had previous contact with the security community. Given the 
cultural differences between the ‘open’ scientific community and the ‘closed’ security 
community, care is needed to avoid a clash of cultures. 18
 
46.  Given these difficulties, the second factor which has influenced successful 
implementation has been the actions of the implementing body – the UK National Counter 
Terrorism Security Office.19 This body has come close to producing a textbook example of 
successful change management. The implementation of new regulations has exploited pre-
existing links and channels of communication between the biosafety and scientific 
communities and used them as avenues into the scientific research community. The 
implementation process has thus far been non-confrontational and, because of the role given 
to biosafety officials, has to some extent been responsive to the organisational culture and 
work practices of the scientific community.  
 
47.  However, only 21% of the sample believed that the police ought to have responsibility 
for protecting against the misuse of the life sciences. Given the bias in the sample, this result 
suggests that practising scientists favour the use of other mechanisms to protect the life 
sciences against misuse.  
 
48. One participant explained that there were good interactions between officials and 
university biosafety staff “but a great deal needs to be done to get leaders of research projects 
involved. They will be at the front line when implementation is required”. It is possible 
therefore that the current low level of support may increase once direct communication 
occurs between the police and practising scientists.  
 
Factors influencing successful implementation 3: the response of the scientific community 
 
49.  The third factor influencing successful implementation has been the proactive response 
of the sample of the UK scientific community. The scientists interviewed repeatedly 
expressed a recognition that scientific research does not exist within a moral or social vacuum 
and that they, as scientists, have to be responsive to changes in society. As a result, they were 
                                                 
18 Atlas R, “National security and the biological research community”, Science, vol 298, no 5594, 2002. 
19 The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) is a specialist police organisation co-located with 
the Security Service in the National Security Advice Centre. For more information see 
http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page163.html#police
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inclined to take a flexible and proactive approach to risk management. Even in situations 
where the sample thought that the risk assessments were unrealistic, they recognised the need 
to be responsive to public concerns and to take into consideration not just risks, but also the 
public’s concerns and perceptions about those risks.  
 
50.  Although general awareness within the sample of the UK scientific community about 
current issues related to preventing legitimate science and technology being misused was 
quite low, there was a much higher level of awareness about how a scientist engaged on 
legitimate work might unknowingly contribute to the development of biological weapons or 
to bioterrorism. For example, participants believed that a scientist could unknowingly 
contribute by manipulating an organism to “overcome natural and therapeutic controls”, by 
“inappropriate release of information”, or “by making loans or gifts of equipment”. Many in 
the sample believed that their awareness of the issues could improve if there was an 
opportunity for increased interaction with the government officials who design biosecurity 
policies.  
 
51.  The respondents also regularly reflected on the unintended consequences of different 
policies because of what the sample of the UK scientific community regarded as a lack of 
appreciation of the subtleties of scientific research. For example, policies based on the 
constraint of dissemination of information at the publication stage were considered 
inappropriate because the research methodology and findings would already have been 
publicised at conferences. Similarly, controls restricting the number of foreign nationals with 
access to dangerous pathogens were considered problematic in an environment where 
universities are actively encouraged to increase their foreign student numbers.  
 
52.  Many in the sample repeatedly expressed their desire to be better guardians of their 
science and wished to be more actively involved in the process of developing effective UK 
biosecurity policies by offering their scientific expertise and cultural knowledge. These 
participants felt they could be better guardians if they had better understanding of the types 
and risks of misuse, and of the logic underpinning regulatory measures such as control lists 
and export licences.  
 
53.  Their desire to have more active engagement with biosecurity officials is unlikely to be a 
result of any perceived direct benefit, as only 15% of the sample had received any. Their 
desire is more likely to stem from revulsion at the possibility of their legitimate research 
being misused and concerns about the impact of inappropriate regulations. 
 
Risk management and the scientific community  
 
54.  Although this pilot project only explored a very specific part of security policy with a 
very small sample of the UK scientific community, it does suggest that there has been a 
major change in how the scientific community conceives of risk and attempts to manage it. 
On several occasions our interviewees stated that the BSE disaster had fundamentally 
changed the way that British society was prepared to accept risk assessments from scientists. 
Similarly, the House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology report on 
Science and Society20 drew attention to how the British public was increasingly unwilling to 
accept scientific statements in an unquestioning manner. Partly in response to these changes, 
interviewees noted that the social legitimacy of scientific knowledge is increasingly 
                                                 
20 House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, Science and Society, HMSO, March 2002. 
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dependent on scientists engaging with wider society, suggesting that the proposals of the 
Royal Society report on the management of scientific risk have been adopted.21
 
55.  Clearly the project was drawing on a self-selecting sample of interviewees who, by 
agreeing to be interviewed, were already more likely to be inclined to engage outside their 
disciplines. However, the consistency of their responses suggests that there is at least a 
subpopulation of the scientific community that not only recognises the risks of misuse of 
scientific knowledge, but also recognises the importance of public perceptions of that risk, 
and their role in responding to those perceptions. This reflexive nature can be seen by the fact 
that while 47% would consider editorial scrutiny of papers at publication, only 39% believed 
the process would reduce the risks of misuse. This indicates that at least some thought that 
such policies should be considered either because they might be effective for unintended 
reasons, or because they considered them effective ways of dealing with other concerns and 
perceptions. 
 
56.  Interviews suggested that the scientific community was prepared to expend considerable 
effort engaging with the wider community to generate and maintain what Gibbons and 
colleagues call ‘socially robust knowledge’.22 In the context of biological weapons non-
proliferation this involved recognising the uncertainties surrounding risk assessments and a 
focus on processes that manage and reduce unknown and possibly unknowable risks. This 
focus on improving risk management processes is reflected in the support for the Health and 
Safety Executive as the preferred medium through which government should enact 
regulations. The Health and Safety Executive has a long established working relationship 
with the scientific community and focuses on allowing scientists to exploit their expert 
knowledge of local situations to create more effective policy. While the academic social 
science literature has called for the scientific community to be more reflexive in its approach 
to risk management, our results, though only indicative, suggest that at the micro-level this 
has already happened. The policy issue is therefore not about changing scientists’ 
understanding of risk, but of providing them with the time and resources they need to 
effectively engage with the policy making process.  
 
Reflections  
 
57.  The results from this pilot project indicate that thus far, the implementation of UK 
biosecurity controls has been carried out with limited negative impact on the scientific 
community. It thus appears that post 9/11 changes in attitudes and procedures within the 
scientific community working with controlled pathogens have been less disruptive in the UK 
than in the US and German scientific communities.  
 
58.  As already mentioned, it is possible that this research was undertaken too early, and that 
future legislation or improperly handled implementation has the potential to generate 
substantial costs to UK science. As such it will be necessary to regularly review the impact of 
dual use controls on UK science. This project has developed and validated a methodology to 
identify relevant members of the scientific community and obtain such information.  
 
                                                 
21 Royal Society Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management, Second edition, London: UK, The Royal Society, 
1992. 
22 Gibbons M, C Limoges, H Nowotny, S Schwartman, P Scott and P Trow, The New Production of Knowledge, 
London Sage, 1994. 
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59.  One participant highlighted the need for a two-stage implementation process of national 
biosecurity measures – the first stage involving securing adherence with minimal costs, the 
second stage involving a long-term culture change in the scientific community. With the first 
stage being conducted successfully, implementers can now turn their attention to the longer-
term objective of a cultural change within the scientific community. This project has shown 
that this may require a change to the type of engagement currently conducted between the 
scientific and security communities, to take into consideration the norms and practices of the 
scientific community. An appreciation of these norms will reduce potential resistance to new 
or extended biosecurity legislation and may encourage full and effective participation by the 
scientific community in UK efforts to reduce the threat from biological weapons.  
 
Conclusions 
 
60. This Briefing Paper has described a project which developed and validated new methods 
for assessing the impact that UK government biosecurity policies, which were introduced to 
prevent legitimate scientific research from being misused, are having on the practice of 
science.  As already noted, the project has produced three key findings relevant to the 
implementation thus far of biosecurity policy:  
 
•  The first is that implementation of these new national biosecurity measures do not 
seem to have had the same negative impact as has been reported in the US and 
Germany. This is an unexpected finding and is important because it suggests that 
biosecurity policy options do not have to involve a trade-off between advances in 
scientific research and security objectives. While clearly it is possible that advances in 
scientific understanding can increase the risks of misuse, and, similarly, that 
draconian security measures can disrupt science, this finding suggests that, at present, 
this does not necessarily have to be the case. 
 
•  The second is that the successful implementation of these new national biosecurity 
measures was related to three factors  
 
(1) pre-existing biosafety measures which provided some security benefits;  
(2) a responsive approach to regulation by the implementing body; and  
(3) a flexible and socially responsible reaction by this sample of the scientific 
community.  
 
Had any one of these conditions not been in place, the costs could have been 
substantially higher. However, together they have contributed towards successful 
implementation. 
 
•  The third finding is that, while the initial stage of implementing the 2001 Anti 
Terrorism Crime and Security Act has been successful, future efforts to further 
strengthen the biosecurity norm might be more difficult. If further security measures 
are required then a greater degree of interaction between the scientific and the security 
communities will be necessary. Changes to current forms of interaction, so that norms 
and practices of the scientific community are fully considered, may reduce potential 
resistance to new measures and encourage full and active participation in efforts to 
reduce the threat. 
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61.  These results provide valuable insight for consideration by the States Parties to the 
BTWC in regard to identifying effective action in relation to the topics addressed in 2003 in 
regard to the adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions and to 
national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic 
microorganisms and toxins and to the topic for 2005 regarding codes of conduct for 
scientists.  Effective action through measures to control access to materials, knowledge and 
technologies will strengthen the regime totally prohibiting biological weapons and benefit all 
States Parties to the BTWC.  
 
62.  This project has highlighted the fact that although biosafety and biosecurity are 
fundamentally different – biosafety being concerned with protecting the health and safety of 
workers and the environment whilst the central concern of biosecurity is unauthorised 
acquisition – the norms are compatible and it can be argued that the implementation of UK 
biosecurity measures has drawn heavily on the biosafety model. The new biosecurity 
legislation, for instance, has concentrated on tightening existing practices rather than 
introducing radically new requirements. Indeed some of the procedural changes introduced 
into UK laboratories since 2001, such as more rigorous risk assessment procedures, increased 
material safety requirements, and improved recording and regulation of the possession and 
transfer of dangerous materials, might also have occurred as a result of the periodic reviews 
of biosafety that have become the practice in UK workplaces, rather than specifically in 
response to biosecurity legislation and government inspections. 
 
63.  It is noted that the Royal Society in its policy document 04/0523 addressing the issues to 
be considered by the States Parties to the BTWC in 2005 has noted that: 
 
In the UK, scientists must comply with local and national safety legislation that is 
related to some of the BTWC provisions. Consequently, by complying with the safety 
regulations scientists will also be complying with some of the obligations of BTWC or 
the UK 1974 Biological Weapons Act, which implements the terms of the BTWC in 
UK national law. It has been suggested that the requirements of the risk assessment 
process already required by the health and safety regulations could be widened 
slightly to ensure that the proposed activity does not present a risk to the prohibitions 
enshrined in the BTWC (Pearson 200524). However, not all BTWC States Parties have 
national legislation implementing the BTWC or the same level of health and safety 
regulations as the UK.   
  
Introducing extended codes of conduct or practice based on existing health and safety 
regulations provides an opportunity for education and training to reinforce these 
regulations. Such a code would need to be consulted before any new work was 
conducted and at key stages during the project, and have greater value than a code 
that is a reference document. This would also reinforce the responsibility of scientists 
to take into consideration the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their activities.   
 
                                                 
23 The Royal Society, Issues for discussion at the 2005 Meeting of Experts of the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, RS policy document, June 2005. Available at: http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/document.asp?id=1170 
24 Graham S. Pearson, A Code of Conduct for the Life Sciences: A Practical Approach, University of Bradford, 
Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No. 15, November 2004.  Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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This project found evidence of a desire, by scientists, to be better guardians of their work, and 
to be more actively involved in the process of strengthening the biosecurity norm. As such, 
this project supports the view expressed above by the Royal Society that introducing codes of 
conduct or practice provides educational and training opportunities – a by-product of which 
will be better guardianship of their science.  
 
64.  Although this project focuses on the UK’s national biosecurity regulations, introduced 
since 2001, it should be noted that the various health and safety regulations in the UK are 
consistent with the comparable EU regulations. For example, the European Directive 
(98/24/EC)25 Protection of the health and safety of workers from the risks related to chemical 
agents at work and Directive (2000/54/EC)26 Protection of workers from risks related to 
exposure to biological agents at work set out the requirements for the determination and 
assessment of risks in a comparable way to that elaborated in the UK national regulations and 
codes of practice.  In a similar way, the European Directive (98/81/EC)27 sets out the 
requirements for the contained use of genetically modified microorganisms and for the 
provision of risk assessments in a comparable way to that elaborated in the UK national 
regulations and code of practice.  
 
65.  In looking to the wider international scene, it is also noted that adherence to the United 
Nations Environmental Programme’s International Technical Guidelines for Safety in 
Biotechnology28 and The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety29 means that two of the three 
findings from this pilot project (that, in the UK, pre-existing biosafety measures which 
already provided a degree of security, and a responsive approach taken by the implementing 
authority seems to have contributed to initial successful implementation of national 
biosecurity measures), have potential global applicability. 
 
66. The States Parties to the BTWC are recommended to take the findings from this project 
into consideration in considering effective action in regard to the topic for 2005 of codes of 
conduct for scientists and again at the Sixth Review Conference in 2006 when States Parties 
will be giving consideration to further action in regard to the topics addressed in 2003 in 
regard to the adoption of necessary, national measures to implement the prohibitions and to 
national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic 
microorganisms and toxins as well as of the topic for 2005 regarding codes of conduct for 
scientists. 
                                                 
25 European Council, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 98/24/EC of 7 April 1998 on the protection of the health and 
safety of workers from the risks related to chemical agents at work, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L131/11, 5 May 1998.  Available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/ 
oj/dat/1998/l_131/l_13119980505en00110023.pdf 
26 European Council, DIRECTIVE 2000/54/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL of18 
September 2000 on the protection of the health and safety of workers from the risks related to exposure to 
biological agents at work, Official Journal of the European Communities, L262/21, 17 October 2000. 
27 European Council, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 98/81/EC of 26 October 1998 amending Directive 90/219/EEC on 
the contained use of genetically modified micro-organisms, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
L330/13, 5 December 1998.  Available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/ 
oj/dat/1998/l_330/l_33019981205en00130031.pdf 
28 United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP International Technical Guidelines for Safety in 
Biotechnology,  December 1995.  Available at: http://www.biosafetyprotocol.be/UNEPGuid/Contents.html 
29 United Nations Environment Programme, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.  Available at: 
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/protocol.asp 
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ANNEX: Schedule 5 Pathogens and Toxins, Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act, 
200130
 
Viruses Chikungunya virus  
 Congo-crimean haemorrhagic fever virus  
 Dengue fever virus  
 Eastern equine encephalitis virus  
 Ebola virus  
 Hantaan virus  
 Japanese encephalitis virus  
 Junin virus  
 Lassa fever virus  
 Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus  
 Machupo virus  
 Marburg virus  
 Monkey pox virus  
 Rift Valley fever virus  
 Tick-borne encephalitis virus (Russian Spring-Summer encephalitis 
virus)  
 Variola virus  
 Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus  
 Western equine encephalitis virus  
 Yellow fever virus 
Rickettsiae Bartonella  
 quintana (Rochalimea quintana, Rickettsia quintana)  
 Coxiella burnetii  
 Rickettsia prowazeki  
 Rickettsia rickettsii 
Bacteria Bacillus anthracis  
 Brucella abortus  
 Brucella melitensis  
 Brucella suis  
 Burkholderia mallei (Pseudomonas mallei)  
 Burkholderia pseudomallei (Pseudomonas pseudomallei)  
 Chlamydophila psittaci  
 Clostridium botulinum  
 Francisella tularensis  
 Salmonella typhi  
 Shigella dysenteriae  
 Vibrio cholerae  
 Yersinia pestis 
Toxins Aflatoxins  
 Botulinum toxins  
 Clostridium perfringens toxins  
 Conotoxin  
                                                 
30 The Act is available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2001/20010024.htm
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 Microcystin (Cyanginosin)  
 Ricin  
 Saxitoxin  
 Shiga toxin  
 Staphylococcus aureus toxins  
 Tetrodotoxin  
 Verotoxin 
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